

Educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis

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Abstract This paper presents a praxiological analysis of three everyday educational practices or strategies that can be considered as being directed at the moral formation of the emotions. The first consists in requests to imagine other's emotional reactions. The second comprises requests to imitate normative emotional reactions and the third to re-appraise the features of a situation that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories is not just that they help to organize and recognize the significance of what might otherwise appear to be a disparate set of ordinary moral-educational interactions between children and educators. We suggest, further, that this analysis provides some new insight into what distinguishes the broad and recurrent conceptions of moral education from one another. Rather than being straightforwardly reducible to intractable differences over core normative or meta-ethical questions they can also be seen as correlating with different suppositions about the central role of the emotions in moral life and, correspondingly, different but to a large degree compatible interpretations of what the “education of the moral emotions” primarily means.

Keywords Conceptions of moral education · Ethics · Emotions · Emotional regulation · Moral education

Introduction

The broad question of educating the moral emotions divides, following Kristjánsson (2005), into three inter-related but analytically distinguishable sub-questions. One is the evaluative question of whether emotions are the appropriate objects of moral-educational attention. Another is the psychological question which concerns

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whether and how emotions can be regulated, shaped or guided using educational as opposed to non-educational means. A final question considers the development and implementation of specific techniques or interventions that can be used by educators in various settings in the day-to-day work of moral education. This is the pedagogical question and it is the focus of this paper.

Readers in search of a handy list of strategies that are easily implemented in a classroom setting or in everyday parenting, however, will be disappointed and are advised to look elsewhere. Where to send such a reader, however, is a question in its own right. The reason for this is because the relevant material is generally woven into a wider educational and research agenda dedicated to understanding and fostering something called “social and emotional growth” and “social and emotional competence” (cf. e.g., Adalbjarnardóttir, 1993; Chalmers & Townsend, 1990; Cohen, 1999, 2001; Edelstein & Fauser, 2001; Elias et al., 1997; Goleman, 1995; Grossman et al., 1997; McMahon et al., 2000; Webster-Stratton, 1999). Indeed, with the exception of the odd module dealing nominatively with “moral growth” (e.g., in Edelstein & Fauser, 2001), it is probably safe to say that not a single intervention programme or identifiable body of educational practices or strategies grounded in a major theoretical perspective in contemporary social psychology exists which specifically and explicitly targets moral emotions. One is more likely to find (or not to find) educational material that deals directly with the emotions and moral education in the philosophy of education journals. This body of literature is in a state of constant expansion owing to a resurgence of philosophical interest in the emotions over the last 20 years or so. The scales will fall from the excited educator’s eyes, however, when she discovers that the general thrust of these carefully argued texts is to extol the prophylactic or developmental benefits of such things as reading stories (e.g., Carr, 2005; Greene, 1995; Kristjánsson, 2005; Noddings, 1998; Nussbaum, 2001), listening to music (Nussbaum, 1995, 2001; Kristjánsson, 2005), role-playing activities like “method acting” (Verducci, 2000) and to remind us, as Aristotle knew so long ago, that if the sentimental dispositions constitutive of the moral virtues are not cultivated and inculcated through habituation in childhood they are unlikely to emerge later in life (cf. Kristjánsson, 2005; Stuetel & Spiecker, 2004). All true enough, perhaps, but cold comfort to our teacher seeking educational alternatives in the daily struggle with her 25 little monsters. Turning back to the psychological literature, the now concentrated mind will perceive two identifiable threads making up the skein of existing intervention and prevention programmes that go under the heading of social and emotional education. One strand is concerned with the development of social and emotional competencies as part of a focussed endeavour to prevent or correct criminal or otherwise harmful behaviour. Prominent in this category are programmes dedicated to anger management (e.g., Second Step and Papillo) and working with juvenile delinquents (e.g., Chalmers & Townsend, 1990; Gibbs, 2003). The other more broadly formative strand aims, through a wide variety of means, to equip children with the social skills and “knowledge concepts” needed in various aspects of social life: making friends and forming “positive” relationships, focussing on tasks and problem solving, democratic participation and citizenship, motivation to learn, co-operate and get along with others, and communication skills (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2001; Elias et al., 1997; Edelstein & Fauser, 2001; Webster-Stratton, 1999). Cutting across this distinction between preventive interventions and general social and emotional learning are differences in theoretical perspectives which seems to be largely responsible for determining intervention content. Authors

who adhere to the classical Kohlbergian/Piagetan structural-cognitive framework tend to focus on social cognition, problem solving and decentration through the development of capacities for perspective taking (e.g., Adalbjarnardóttir, 1993; Chalmers & Townsend, 1990; Edelstein & Fauser, 2001; Gibbs, 2003). By contrast, there are those who, in line with the more recent expansionist trend in the psychology of moral development (cf. discussions in Campbell, 2005; Lapsley and Narváez, 2005), work with a more diverse palette of competencies. Here, the fostering of emotional understanding, emotional expression, emotional regulation and empathy skills are central touch-points (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2001; Elias et al., 1997; Grossman et al., 1997; McMahon et al., 2000; Webster-Stratton, 1999).

While this literature on social and emotional education and the educational cultivation of moral feelings is without question a treasure trove of much which is of great educational value, the already overworked educator can take some solace in the fact that all this research and careful planning distracts attention from the fact that a great deal of probably rather effective moral education of the moral emotions goes on right under our noses. That is to say, she is in all likelihood *already* practiced in the education of the moral emotions whether she knows it or not. The present paper develops a catalogue of these strategies which we discuss under three broad headings. The first consists in requests to *imagine* other's emotional reactions. The second comprises requests to *imitate* normative emotional reactions and the third to *re-appraise* the features of a situation that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories, however, is not just that they help to organize and recognize the significance of what might otherwise appear to be a disparate set of ordinary moral-educational interactions between children and educators. We suggest, further, that this praxiological analysis provides some new insight into what distinguishes the broad and recurrent conceptions of moral education from one another. Rather than being straightforwardly reducible to intractable differences over core normative or meta-ethical questions they can also be seen as correlating with different suppositions about the central role of the emotions in moral life and, correspondingly, different but to a large degree compatible interpretations of what the "education of the moral emotions" primarily means (Fig. 1).

Pedagogy of autonomy versus pedagogy of control

Before going on to discuss the three broad classes of moral-emotional educational strategies in detail, it would be amiss not to observe an important line that can be drawn between strategies that are *educational* versus strategies which merely aim at *social control*. What makes the two types of strategies easy to confuse is that, when they succeed at least, their effects on behaviour are for all intents and purposes indistinguishable. Where they are crucially different, however, is in the means employed to achieve those effects and, in particular, the evaluative status of those means. Borrowing Hügli's (1999) compelling contrast between "pedagogies of autonomy" and "pedagogies of control", this section aims, after first explaining the distinction, to elucidate how it is that the *requests* to imagine, imitate, and reappraise that are the focus of our discussion fall quite clearly under the heading of pedagogies of autonomy rather than being forms of moral-emotional behavioural modification and manipulation.

	Educational strategies	Regulative ideal	Targeted emotion	Theoretical affinities	Contemporary moral education
pedagogy of autonomy	<i>Imagination</i>	emergence & support	“moral” emotions	moral sense theory & naturalistic eudaimonism	care ethics
	<i>Imitation</i>	modulation	all	Aristotelian ethics	character education
	<i>Re-Appraisal</i>	suppression	all	Kantian ethics	cognitive developmentalism
pedagogy of control	<i>Behavior modification & manipulation</i>	socially desirable reaction patterns	all	social learning theory & behaviourism	“Triple-P” parenting, Super Nanny, student behaviour management

Fig. 1 Educating moral emotions: an analytic framework

Pedagogies of autonomy are an expression of a characteristically modern perspective on the morally legitimate and socially desirable aims and corresponding means of education. From this perspective, the aim of education is personal and moral autonomy which seems to come largely down to a person’s ability and disposition to reflect upon and judge her own inclinations and desires. A morally autonomous person, as Frankfurt (1971) might have put it, establishes *second order desires*; she asks whether and how desirable her own desires are and whether it is good to want what she wants. The consequence of this view is as straightforward as it is easy to fail to fully appreciate: the internalization of moral norms is not the *non plus ultra* goal of a pedagogy of autonomy. Unless one admits that the internalization of certain moral norms is *also* in some sense an educational necessity, at least if one cares to maintain certain basic levels of social stability, moral autonomy does not seem very attractive as an aim of moral education (cf. Peters, 1981). At the same time, the internalization of a moral norms is not “proof” of moral heteronomy any more than it is proof of moral autonomy; it can, in fact, be a result of *either* autonomous moral reflection on morally desirable ends in life *or* the result of mere

social control, be the latter intended, say, as some part of an educational regime or just as a haphazard fact of socialization.

The point of pedagogies of control is not, of course, to support autonomy or reflective judgment but are mainly intended as interventions that more-or-less guarantee (what are held in advance to be) socially desirable *behavioural outcomes*. The effectiveness of pedagogies of control can be measured, or at least observed, since their target is something observable: behaviour and not intangibles like “ability” or “insight”. They are interested in, one might say alternatively, performance not competence. The decisive educational question of pedagogies of control is not, “How can we help children become morally autonomous or moral selves?” but rather, “How can we arrange things so that children behave as they should behave?” Insofar as pedagogies of control have at their disposal some kind of technical knowledge, the effectiveness of which can be “measured” at least in a probabilistic sense, pedagogies of autonomy, by contrast, suffer from a “technological deficit” in Luhmann and Schorr’s (1982) meaning that their effectiveness is limited and their outcome uncertain. Pedagogies of autonomy endeavour to strengthen insight and reflection and are fully aware that the child is not yet morally autonomous. The *aim* is autonomy but the means try to bring the child up to the level of autonomy by operating *as if* the child were already autonomous: *as if* the child could already understand, *as if* the child were able to transcend his or her precarious desires, *as if* the child had the ability to “role-take” (Selman, 1980) or to imagine himself into another person’s shoes, *as if* the child were rationally motivated and mainly interested in becoming a good person, and so on. Such as-if structures are representative of the fact that the educational relationship involves first and foremost communication *between subjects*, that educational communication is *inter-subjective* communication. Pedagogies of control prioritize subject-object relations instead: the child is the more-or-less passive object of educational strategies, the object of reinforcement plans and sometimes even outright manipulation. It is true, pedagogies of control are more effective, and their effectiveness may indeed render services for the good, but from the perspective of pedagogies of autonomy, they are morally precarious. If they were fully effective, if an education system could produce the “morally good person” designed and shaped exactly according to plan, its product would be heteronomous agents—i.e., human beings that fail to possess what is unquestionably *the* central characteristic of moral agency in the Kantian tradition in ethics (Hill, 2000). Proponents of pedagogies of autonomy thus do not lament of education’s “technological deficit”. On the contrary, they advocate in favour of strict constraints or even prohibition, in Benner’s (1979) sense, on educational technology.

The tensions between pedagogies of control and pedagogies of autonomy do not imply, for all that, that educators who view the ideal of autonomy favourably must renounce social-control strategies altogether. That the belief that education can somehow do without behaviour modification is still so widespread does not make it any less naïve. Many acts performed in educational contexts, and surely all the ones judged to be “necessary” (providing positive feedback for instance) can be understood in one way or another as reinforcement strategies. However, what makes matters significantly more complicated is that just as pedagogies of autonomy cannot, in one regard, do without pedagogies of control neither can pedagogies of control do without do without pedagogies of autonomy. The popular television show “Super Nanny” and the well-known “Triple-P” approach to education (i.e., the “Positive Parenting Program”) both put forward models of

control pedagogy which are not sensitive to the demands and complexities of pedagogies of autonomy. They work. For this reason alone they are highly regarded and valued positively. However, they suffer from two defects that are relevant to the present discussion. First, they ride on the confusion between education and social control. People find them attractive because they seem to identify ways of getting children to freely choose what they ought to choose. But what one fails to notice—and this feature is of course never explicitly stated—is that they trade almost exclusively in the currencies of emotional manipulation and the systematic deployment of Hobson's choice. Second, they ignore the significance of *presupposing* autonomy as an educational act. While behaviour modification is necessary in education, *reducing* education to behaviour modification leaves one blind to the need to strengthen basic social competencies appropriate to contemporary society, central among which is undoubtedly the willingness to act *as if* one were autonomous in full knowledge that one is not.

Pedagogies of autonomy do not try to directly act on the child but are characterized instead by their expression of *requests* or reason-based *appeals* to change in one way or the other. It should come as no surprise, then, that the education of the moral emotions might consist centrally in *requests* to alter, regulate or otherwise adapt emotional responses. To illustrate, consider the way perspective-taking is commonly used in everyday moral education. Perspective-taking, of course, has no moral value in and of itself for it can be used also for morally dubious goals. But perspective taking, as a tool of moral education as it were, cannot be fully understood without reference to emotion. Indeed, whether it is self-focussed (i.e., involves imagining how one would feel *oneself* in another person's situation) or other-focussed (i.e., how another person would feel in a particular situation given that person's beliefs, desires, and so on) social perspective taking as education *just is* a request to put oneself into the *emotional* situation of the other.¹ Take, for example, the case of Larry and Carol, two preschoolers playing together with blocks. There is only one *really good* reason why Carol should not destroy the tower that her brother Larry has built: Larry would *feel* bad about it. The children's mother, seeing Carol's intention to destroy Larry's tower, might say: "Carol, you wouldn't want Larry to destroy your tower, would you?" Such speech act can be interpreted as *request to imagine*. What she is inviting Carol to do, in other words, is to imagine how she would feel if her brother destroyed her tower. The mother knows, of course, that if Carol's perspective-taking exercise is empathically accurate she will arrive at the conclusion not that Larry would neither feel good nor be indifferent about it but that he would feel bad about it. Additionally, the mother supposes that Carol will evaluate Larry's feelings negatively; she will think that it is bad for Larry to feel bad. Most importantly, however, Carol will view Larry's feelings *normatively*—i.e., she will take the prospect of Larry's feeling hurt as a *reason* not to destroy his tower. As this example illustrates, educational interactions such as requesting to engage in some relevant exercise of the imagination involve a rather complex set of suppositions about the emotional reaction patterns of both the actual and prospective transgressor and the actual or prospective transgressor. These suppositions, although understood on all sides, are rarely if ever spelled out, partly because children might not be able to understand them even if they were but also because an explicit

¹ On the distinction between self- and other-focussed perspective taking see Hoffman (2000) and Blum (1980a, b).

analytic understanding of the technique is neither here nor there from the point of view of its operation. On the other hand, it might be due to this complexity that such requests very often—maybe even most often—do not work and that pedagogies of autonomy are by their very nature apparently limited in their effectiveness. That said, the effectiveness or success of the intervention might just be the wrong place to look for the value of such educational interventions. More important than the success or failure of a discrete educational interaction, perhaps, is rather the way the child is *addressed* within the framework of a pedagogy of autonomy: *as if* she were willing and able to understand and then change her intentions. As if, that is, she were autonomous (cf. Reichenbach, 2001). In this case, the fact that the conditions of such counterfactual suppositions is not met does not render such practices incoherent as long as such forms of communication strengthen the *self*-supposition of the child or young person as being (counter-factually) an autonomous agent. If nothing else, it is an important ingredient in self-efficacy (cf. Bandura, 1977).

Imagination

As suggested in the foregoing discussion, requests to imagine how one would feel in the position of a potential or actual victim seem to suppose that “empathizing” or vicarious involvement in another’s experience of suffering spontaneously generates feelings of sympathy, compassion or concern for the suffering person. The noteworthy exception to this is in cases of deserved suffering; as a general rule, a person who merits her suffering is not an appropriate object of compassion.²

Some basic level of moral-affective responsiveness seems to be almost universally regarded as a psychological precondition of normal social functioning.³ Post-Darwinian explanations of the apparently natural human disposition towards this “fellow feeling” tend to appeal to the adaptive value of this trait in small groups of human beings who must cooperate with one another in order to survive, social conditions thought to characterise all but the tiniest fraction of human evolutionary history (cf. e.g., Hoffman, 1981). Seen in this way as a broad, general and quasi-perceptive *disposition* the problem of regulation is primarily a problem of socialization: Which social conditions or social interactions favour, support, reinforce and enhance the emergence of sympathetic responding and which impede it? (cf. Hoffman, 2000)

Clearly, particular emotions are favourable to a moral outlook and moral behaviour—sympathy and compassion seem to be the paradigmatic examples—while other emotions—malice, rage, callousness and hatred, for example—are correspondingly unfavourable (de Sousa, 2001).⁴ A few other emotions can be

² This is much of what lies behind the fact that rationalizations for failures to meet obligations to people in need often turn on claims about desert: the pittance paid out to recipients of social assistance is justified because such people are lazy (i.e., they could find work if they wanted to); provocative clothing worn by women who are victims of sexual harassment or assault should be considered a mitigating circumstance when assessing the degree of guilt of the male perpetrator, etc. For a general discussion of desert-based emotions see Kristjánsson (2003). On the relationship between sympathy and desert see the classic discussion in Smith (1790/1976).

³ Nietzsche’s moral psychology represents a rare dissenting view. See, e.g., 2003 .

⁴ De Sousa labels the latter “nasty” emotions and the former “nice” emotions (cf. 2001). For a similar account see Ben Ze’ev (2001).

considered “moral” emotions on the condition that they are directed at others’ well-being; one can love and care about gardening or model trains and one can be concerned or preoccupied with the declining health of a diseased person from a purely clinical point of view. Unlike care, concern and love, however, sympathy and compassion seem to be categorically moral emotions because they are, and this by definition apparently, states of involvement in another *person’s* suffering (or perhaps the suffering of sentient beings more broadly) as something to be alleviated (cf. Blum, 1980a, b; Mercer, 1972; Nagel, 1970; Nussbaum, 2001).

Much of the moral significance of compassion, sympathy and empathy derive from their widely recognized contribution to moral motivation. Furthermore, according to some philosophical accounts, the active engagement of these emotions is a *sine qua non* of the ability to formulate moral assessments (cf. Hume, 1751/1957; Smith, 1790/1976; Scheler, 1954; Vetlesen, 1994, Blum, 1980b).⁵ In regards to moral motivation, moral emotions may: (i) provide a motivational counterweight to a harmful intention by contributing to feelings of guilt or shame either at the prospect of harming another (cf. Hoffman, 2000); or (ii) motivate actions that are intended to alleviate perceived suffering (i.e., “pro-social”, “helping” or “altruistic” behaviours; cf. esp. Batson, 1991; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a, b). Having said that, one should not be misled into thinking that compassion is *only* appropriate where one can help. Although compassion clearly can be a motive to beneficent acts as well, it is first and foremost an appropriate and rational response to witnessing the undeserved plight of a person one is concerned about.

Requests to role-take or “imagine” are surely the most recognizable pedagogical strategy associated with this general conception of the education of the moral emotions. This was discussed at sufficient length in Sect. 2 to warrant no further elaboration here. Other recurrent suggestions for how to cultivate compassionate empathy are through the use of literature and the arts as occasions to both develop the imagination and put it to use in what could be called a decentration exercise: practice considering others’ perspectives and the demands that an appreciation of those perspectives make through vicarious identification (see e.g., Nussbaum, 2001; Noddings, 1998; Greene, 1995). Noddings’ care ethics, not unlike Rousseau, focuses mainly on the contribution of the broader social context on the emergence and development of the moral-emotional disposition. Whereas Rousseau (1762/1979) pursues a well-known non-interventionist strategy, promoting informal and unconstrained peer interaction as a means of protecting children’s propensity for natural sympathy and justice from the corrupting influences of adults, care ethics recommends the active provision of a rich palette of opportunities to engage in caring relationships. It suggests further that educators can strengthen a commitment to caring among children by explicitly framing school relationships and activities (notoriously, even doing math) as involving a significant caring dimension. This way, they are encouraged to interpret human activity generally as caring activity and themselves as carers, a correct interpretation according to Noddings (cf. Noddings, 1984, 1990).

⁵ This is the subject of much philosophical controversy and to elaborate on these complex issues is not relevant to the present discussion. For the purposes of our argument, it is only important that some people actually hold that the construction of moral problems, etc. draws on capacities of empathic response and not whether or not this is the case.

Care ethics is more faithfully represented as an intellectual descendent of Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan's (1982) feminist psychoanalytic theory than moral sense theory or naturalist eudaimonism. Nevertheless, as a contemporary conception of moral education it is the most recognizably aligned with the educational enhancement and support of the natural emergence of the moral emotions. Noddings, care ethics' undisputed leading proponent, considers caring to be ontologically basic to human experience and has argued for years that the educational worth of any aim, activity, policy and set of institutional arrangements should be assessed in terms of its potential to preserve and enhance caring relationships (cf. esp. 1992). From this perspective, moral education is distinguishable from other aspects of education only as an analytic category that promotes the "ethical ideal" of caring understood at the highest level of abstraction (cf. esp. 1984, Ch. 8).

Given that human beings are apparently endowed both with an altruistic disposition and a singular capacity for cruelty, it should come as no surprise that naturalistic eudaimonistic philosophies through the ages—ideas prominent in the writings of Epictetus (e.g., 1st century C.E./1925), Seneca (e.g., 1st century C.E./1969), Lao-Tzu (e.g., 6th century B.C.E./2000) and Rousseau (e.g., 1754/1992) among others—should prescribe the cultivation of the moral emotions. More recently, and largely as an expression of dissatisfaction with excessive rationalism in ethical theory, latter-day proponents of moral sense theory claim that the ability to form moral judgements presupposes the active exercise of sympathy. Hume (1751/1957), for instance and as noted above, considered that moral "approval" of an act or character trait just is the feeling that the act or character trait in question is conducive to general human well-being. Analogous ideas are central to Smith's (1790/1976) theory of moral sentiments and Max Scheler's (1954) "inverted Kantianism" (cf. Vetlesen, 1994).

Imitation

Requests to "imitate" are requests to bring spontaneous emotional reactions into line with a normative standard of appropriate emotional response in a set of circumstances. Emotional responses are commonly the subject of normative evaluation; one can say, for instance, that one *should* be cheerful when visiting elderly relatives, respectful when dealing with a legitimate authority, apologetic towards a person one has hurt, show sympathy in the face of undeserved suffering and feel guilty when having transgressed a moral rule that one accepts. Whether or not one agrees with these or other substantive claims about the kinds of emotional reactions that are appropriate in a given situation is neither here nor there. The claim here is that such reactions are widely and probably universally viewed as the appropriate object of moral evaluation. Even though the content of such evaluations will naturally vary to some degree from cultural community to cultural community the basic phenomenon of evaluating emotional responses is probably a constant.

Requests to modulate one's emotional reactions so as to achieve the normatively required measure and proportion of emotional response a situation calls for do not just demand outward conformity. Nor do they simply promulgate normative standards of affective responding. Imitation as a sentimental-education strategy also seems to suppose that *putting on* an emotional reaction, if done frequently and consistency and under proper tutelage, can over time habituate spontaneous genuine

appropriate affective responding (cf. Steutel & Spiecker, 2004). Just as pretending not to be afraid—“pulling oneself together”—in the face of, say, fear of getting on an airplane can in some cases be the first step towards overcoming fear of flying. So too can a pattern of envy towards others’ successes be transformed into a pattern of feeling happy for others by the habitual *dissimulation* of envy and the *display* of gladness.⁶

Requests to imagine, as we saw in Sect. 3, attempt to generate or enhance a specific set of emotions that are regarded as conducive to a moral outlook. Because requests to imitate target any emotional response that deviates from the circumstantially prescribed norm, whatever that response might be, no specific range of emotions seems to be the appropriate object of requests to imitate. It is worth attending to, however, that some emotions seem categorically normatively inappropriate and hence a coherent object only of requests to pretend *not* to experience them. These emotions would cover, surely, all the “nasty” emotions referred to above—malice, rage, callousness and the like—but might encompass such emotions as pride, Schadenfreude and maudlin, among others.

The general regulative strategy operative in requests to imitate has been discussed under the heading of “bootstrapping” (cf. Kristjánsson, 2005; de Sousa, 1987). Bootstrapping, attempts to make oneself experience an emotion, occurs in three distinct cases. First, there are cases where there is a complete absence of the appropriate emotion. Here one must bootstrap oneself into putting on or displaying it. Second, there are cases where some emotional reaction occurs but it is the wrong one. In these cases one must dissimulate the inappropriate emotion and act out the correct one. A third identifiable instance of bootstrapping occurs in cases where one indeed experiences the right emotion but not at the desired *intensity* as, for instance, when one feigns being very impressed by a three-year-old nephew’s “drawing” or, conversely, tempers one’s urge to laugh seeing, say, someone absent-mindedly bump into a lamppost.

When it is a question of acting out some emotion one can do little else than draw on one’s skills in the thespian arts. A variety of different emotion-regulation strategies, however, are available to assist the bootstrapping process in cases where existing emotional reactions need to be altered, tempered or increased. It is certainly safe to say that these techniques are not specifically suggested in requests to imitate but are generally discovered and exercised more-or-less spontaneously.

One is attentional deployment (cf. Gross, 1998; Kristjánsson, 2005), where one directs one’s attention away from the source of the emotion (e.g., when one tries to think of something other than whatever is making one laugh when one should be serious or sad when one should be cheerful) or, possibly, when one dwells on relevant emotion-evoking features of some situation in order to intensify an emotion that is only weakly felt (e.g., trying to think about how sad the family must feel at a funeral, how one would feel in their place, attending to the sad expressions on their faces, etc.).

Another is situation selection and modification (cf. Ben Ze’ev, 2000; Gross, 1998; Kristjánsson, 2005). Typically, this technique is employed in situations where one attempts to avoid an emotional reaction one knows in advance will be provoked by a given set of circumstances (e.g., avoiding becoming irritable by avoiding watching excerpts from the speeches of idiotic politicians on the news; Ben Ze’ev, 2000) which

⁶ See Steutel and Spiecker (2004), pp. 542–543 for a detailed account of the operation of habituation.

are not of direct relevance to the present discussion.⁷ There are nevertheless circumstances where situation selection and modification can be used against inappropriate spontaneous emotions. All experienced teachers, for example, have at least once been witness to the amusing spectacle of a (usually teen- or tween-age female) student running out of the classroom in a desperate last-ditch attempt to control a bad case of the giggles.

A third and final relevant emotional-regulation strategy is so-called “response modulation”. Rather than being a single identifiable technique, however, response modulation embraces a whole variety of techniques discussed widely in the psychological literature as a means to control the actions emotions risk motivating: hitting someone or saying something nasty out of anger and the like (cf. Gross, 1998; Kristjánsson, 2005). Kristjánsson (2005) is quite right to point out that since such techniques as counting to 10, taking three deep breaths and so on⁸ are directed at checking behaviours and not the behaviour-motivating emotion they might be more aptly considered “behaviour-” rather than “emotion regulation” techniques (p. 677). That said, one would have to admit as well, it seems, that while such exercises do not aim to eliminate dangerous or unpleasant emotions altogether they are thought to *diffuse* the emotion and in this sense they do target the emotion. In any case, contrast between behaviour-regulation versus emotion-regulation that this remark brings to light, raises the little-discussed issue of what could be called emotional “sincerity obligations”.

The normative requirement generated in some situations seems to call for *only* a convincing behavioural display of the appropriate emotional reaction. In these situations, the actual or sincere experience of the emotion is supererogatory. To illustrate, a physician who feels genuine sympathy for a patient when he delivers a bad prognosis would certainly be considered a moral cut above the physician who just delivers the bad prognosis in a convincingly sympathetic way, given certain facts about the professional life of a doctor (i.e., that such situations, while always unpleasant, are nevertheless routine). However, the demands of due patient respect would seem to be met by an attempt to *appear* sympathetic. Similarly, in the masquerade of friendliness that goes on (to greater and lesser degrees depending on one’s cultural jurisdiction) between clients and service workers in the retail sector, whereas outright unfriendliness a massive social *faux pas* it is understood on all sides that such friendliness is almost always play acting. And here again while it is certainly better to be genuine there is no general sincerity obligation. By contrast, intimate relationships governed by the rules of Romantic love do seem to come with sincerity obligations. Allowing for occasional moments when one must make an effort to feel affectionate, a chronic absence of genuine feelings of affection of the “you-don’t-love-me-anymore” variety is commonly taken *ipso facto* as the death knell of the relationship and renders the special obligations it generates null and void.

⁷ The assumption that feelings can be avoided by avoiding the situations that cause the feelings seems to underlie the legal measure known as a “restraining orders” where men found guilty of domestic violence are legally barred from entering the proximity of their former victims and diagnosed paedophiles may not go near schools.

⁸ Other examples can be found in the teaching material comprising the well-received Second-Step anti-violence program.

Because requests to imitate are best understood as a strategy aimed at cultivating emotional dispositions that are in part constitutive of acting well and appropriately—as opposed to just choosing the right action and carrying it out with a good intention—imitation seems intimately linked with the Aristotelian tradition in ethics. Within this tradition, however, longstanding divergences exist over the inter-related meta-ethical questions of the justification of the virtues and why being virtuous is worthy of choice. Is the ideal of a virtuous character highly culturally specific and comprehensible only against a background of traditions and practices (as in e.g. MacIntyre, 1981; Taylor, 1989; Walzer, 1983)? Or is it a universal ideal of human excellence that expresses what it means to do well or flourish as a human being qua human being (cf. Anscombe, 1958; McKinnon, 2005)? Or some combination of the two? (e.g., Carr, 1996)

Imitation seems to find its natural contemporary home in character education (see e.g., Kilpatrick, 1992; Lickona, 1992). Although character education exists in many forms and permutations which more-or-less reflect the variety of positions available within virtue theory itself, proponents of character education rally around the belief that the formation of moral dispositions is a vital part of moral education and ascribe to a comprehensive definition of character which views character as comprising dispositions of thought, action and feeling (cf. Carr & Steutel, 1999; McLaughlin & Halstead, 1999). Steutel and Spiecker (2004, p. 532) have instructively summarized the unifying set of beliefs and suppositions about the education and cultivation of proper affective disposition underlying this contested Aristotelian tradition in moral education. First, sentimental education is *necessary* in the sense that a failure to recognize the need for it is a sign of a fundamental misunderstanding of the very purpose of moral education—namely, to promote moral excellences, excellences which are invariably (but not entirely) defined in terms of particular dispositions to morally appropriate affective response. Second, it is *significant* in the sense that sentimental education should be viewed as being central to the moral education of children. Finally, sentimental education is educationally *basic* in the sense that the *mise en place* of the right kinds of affective dispositions is ancillary to the furthering of non-moral excellences that are essential to the education enterprise more broadly construed—virtues of the will and intellectual virtues.

Re-appraisal

Requests to re-appraise focus on emotions as involved in moral perception and moral motivation. What one is asked to re-appraise, typically, is whether one's emotional response to a situation is based on an acceptable, justified or correct reading of the situation, with the suggestion that it is not. As such re-appraisals highlight the rationality of emotions; the appropriateness of an emotional response is subject to assessment in terms of publicly accessible standards of judgement and practical wisdom involves attentiveness to the facts (cf. Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2005). For instance, anger towards a person who, accidentally and without negligence, caused some injury, in jealousy misinterpreting and over-estimating threats to a cherished relationship and, through sympathy, offering to help a person based on a false belief that the person is in need of help are all errors of judgement susceptible to correction by re-appraisal. As such, requests to re-appraise demand

the deployment of so-called cognitive strategies of emotional regulation, attempts to modify one's emotional responses by reconsidering the beliefs that underlie them.⁹

Requests to re-appraise seem to suppose that emotions can play a perceptual role, drawing a person's attention to the morally salient features of a situation and proposing action incentives. Viewing, say, in a bakery a child's repeated request for service being ignored might inspire feelings of indignation which in turn might motivate one to take a stand in the child's defence. However, requests to re-appraise also suppose that this moral-perceptive faculty *is capable of making mistakes*. One's spontaneous emotional responses, in other words, are not a reliable guide to what constitutes right action in a set of circumstances and so must be subjected to what Sherman (1990) refers to as the "regulative constraint" of practical judgement. The way that this idea is most often expressed in informal language is to say that emotions can cloud or distort moral judgment. The exercise of practical wisdom, therefore, in part constitutes ensuring that one's spontaneous appraisal of a situation is consistent with how one would appraise it under conditions of full rationality (cf. Smith, 1994).¹⁰

As in the case of imitation, there does not seem to be any clear limits on the emotions that can be involved in moral misjudgement but given their connection with the moral domain, referred to above, the "moral" emotions (sympathy, compassion and the like) and especially their "nasty" counterparts (anger, spite, rage, malice, etc.) can be expected to be the frequent objects of requests to re-appraise.

Whereas imagination is concerned with the attitudes and feelings connected with a moral outlook, and imitation is concerned with habituation into a more-or-less pre-given ideal of moral character and conduct, re-appraisal is concerned with justification of emotions in relation to public standards of rationality and as a dimension of moral perception and moral motivation. The Kohlbergian/Piagetan structural-cognitive tradition of moral development research and moral education largely reflects these preoccupations. The theoretical base of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, for instance, is primarily an account the reasoning patterns leading up to those typical of morally mature agents (cf. e.g., Kohlberg, 1978). Most importantly for present purposes, from this "moral point of view", embodied in the highest stages, an agent is able to abstract himself from his own interests, traditions, and spontaneous emotional responses and, by submitting them to rational scrutiny, assess their legitimacy as moral action incentives.

Historically, Stoics and Buddhists have been much impressed and exercised by the practical-judgement distorting powers of the emotions. Not advocating the total abnegation of feelings, both these eudaimonistic philosophies hold that desires and passions which are based on mistaken beliefs about the world are responsible for personal and social ills; true beliefs tend to issue in emotional moderation that is consistent with sound practical judgement and a virtuous life. In modern philosophy, Descartes went as far as defining practical wisdom as the mastery of the passions; without their interference the soul would be free in the proper exercise of its rational faculty (cf. Descartes, 2000/1984 esp. §§ 211–212; Garber, 1992). In contemporary Kantian interpretation, the traditional image of the moral agent as a steely eyed calculator of duty has given way to a set of more moderate ideas about Kant's view

⁹ On this "cognitive" strategy of emotional regulation see Kristjánsson (2005), p. 687 and Ben Ze'ev (2000), pp. 229–233.

¹⁰ Full rationality is understood in Bernard Williams's (1981) broad sense of being based on no false beliefs, having only relevant true beliefs and correct deliberation.

of the role of emotions in moral judgement (cf. e.g., Baron, 1997; Herman, 1996; Hill, 2000; Korsgaard, 1999; Sherman, 1990).¹¹ As suggested above, among these is the idea that emotional responses can help construct moral problems and generate morally legitimate action proposals insofar as the deliberating agent could accept as a law in a “kingdom of ends”—i.e., the agent conceiving herself as at once legislator and legal subject—the justificatory principle on which the proposal suggested by an emotion is based.

Concluding remarks

In sum, the foregoing analysis suggests close conceptual affinities between different conceptions of the role of affect in moral life and certain identifiably recurrent conceptions of moral education and their respective associated accounts of moral reflection. If this analysis, true to its intention, is not just an exercise in eclecticism but reflects genuine conceptual relationships between the various ideas discussed two conclusions seem forthcoming. First, perhaps too obvious to state, well-rounded moral-affective formation would be concerned with: (i) the emergence and enhancement of moral emotions like concern for others, sympathy and compassion; (ii) guidance in the moderation of emotional responses in conformity with an ideal of moral character or practical wisdom; and (iii) the development of the faculty of moral judgement and its capacity for the regulative constraint of emotionally grounded desiderative tendencies. Second, and more broadly, it seems to suggest not only *that* part of what distinguishes recurrent conceptions of moral education from one another are disagreements about the role of affect in moral life. It also helps clarify more specifically *what* those disagreements are about. There seems little doubt that the question of whether the moral education of children should pursue, first and foremost, the cultivation of good character, principled choice, or a disposition to care for others turns on deeper and inter-related normative and meta-ethical questions. One arguably normative point of contention is whether ethical reflection should start from the facts of human nature *à la* Aristotle and latter-day virtue ethicists and, in a different way, contemporary care ethics and proponents of eudaimonistic naturalism, or whether it should begin by identifying self-justifying ethical principles *à la* Kant. These issues connect up, in turn, with the more obviously

¹¹ It is also undoubtedly true that Aristotle holds that even a central role of the virtue of *phronesis*, practical wisdom, is the moderation of unruly emotions by way of re-appraisal. Our point in associating re-appraisal with Kant and imitation with Aristotle is not meant to deny this. Indeed, the richness of Kant’s and Aristotle’s ethics is such we have no hesitation in postulating that one will find in both their work an acknowledgement of all three ways in which emotions have moral significance which we have identified—although differences will be apparent in the fine-grained interpretation of their significance. We claim that Kant’s ethics seems to have a greater affinity with re-appraisal, and Aristotle’s with imitation, mainly because of the centrality that each thinker seems to assign to the respective role of these strategies in the achievement of their respective moral ideals. Though the issues here are of a degree of complexity which resists simple formulation, Kant is wary of more-or-less mindless habituation because it is difficult to square with his ideal of rational autonomy. For his part, Aristotle, and on this point he contrasts sharply with Kant, generally regards the conformity of actions to one’s moral obligations *willingly* and, in some cases, frankly *enjoying* it a requirement of virtue. Habituation plays a crucial role in the achievement of this ideal because in many cases—the typical example is facing the enemy courageously in battle—the only way of getting there is by desensitising oneself (or, depending on the case, sensitising oneself) by way of repeated experiences where one tries to performing the virtuous act virtuously. Cf. Aristotle (1955), 1103a14ff.

meta-ethical dispute over whether it is coherent to conceptualise moral justification in abstraction from a normative background of historically or anthropologically given conceptions of human well-being or whether moral judgement can operate sufficiently independently of such a background to be able to meaningfully subject it to objective scrutiny. What this analysis seems to bring to light is not just that these disagreements *might also* be accounted for in terms of a disagreement over which of the three roles of affect in moral life that we have discussed should be accorded pride of place in the most defensible account of moral maturity but, further, that there may be heretofore little explored connections between the normative, meta-ethical and moral-affective claims that delineate competing conceptions of moral education.

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