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Online Publication Date: 01 March 2008

To cite this Article: Maxwell, Bruce (2008) 'Justifying educational acquaintance with the moral horrors of history on psycho-social grounds: 'Facing History and Ourselves' in critical perspective. Ethics and Education, 3:1, 75 - 85

To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/17449640802018693

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449640802018693
Justifying educational acquaintance with the moral horrors of history on psycho-social grounds: ‘Facing History and Ourselves’ in critical perspective

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(Received 16 December 2001; final version received 12 February 2008)

This paper challenges a pervasive curricular justification for educationally acquainting young people with stories of genocide and other moral horrors from history. According to this justification, doing so favours the development of psycho-social soft skills connected with interpersonal awareness and the establishment and maintenance of positive relationships. It is argued that this justification not only renders the specific historical content incidental to the development of these skills. The educational intention of promoting such psycho-social soft skills by way of studying moral horrors in history constitutes an ethically problematic instrumentalisation of the historical material itself.

Keywords: Psycho-social development; human rights education; genocide education; moral education; history curriculum

Introduction

‘This week we have surveyed the events leading to the collapse of Hitler’s regime and the eventual unconditional surrender of the German armed forces to the Allies in the early hours of May 7 1945. Tomorrow, the Holocaust.’ The word itself nearly completes the mise-en-scène of a singular and unmistakable educational event: learning from the cruel past of human association. Such memorable moments from schooling are one home of educational attempts to draw on the moral lessons of gross human rights violations. Another is within any of the human development study programs now commonly offered in institutions of higher education: peace studies, development studies, human rights education, intercultural education, among others (Reardon 1997). It is also a pillar of packaged psycho-social interventions in moral, civic and character education like the well-known US-based holocaust education ‘Facing History and Ourselves’ and the similar Dutch program ‘Coming to Justice’.1

Why should young people learn about events such as the Holocaust, the Thirty Years War, the Rwandan genocide, the virtual destruction of the first nations of America and Australia, and the trans-Atlantic slave trade and its legacy? What can, or should, they learn from them? The distinction between learning from as opposed to learning that, or knowledge by acquaintance as opposed to propositional knowledge,2 is itself rich enough to

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ISSN 1744–9642 print/ISSN 1744–9650 online
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DOI: 10.1080/17449640802018693
http://www.informaworld.com
be the subject of sustained reflection in its own right. But to state it summarily, learning from an historical event seems to bring historical learning close to an aesthetic experience. It seeks to open up imaginative pathways of identification with historical protagonists and it does this in order to communicate something of what it was like to have lived through the historical event.

To paraphrase Carr and Davis (2007), a survivor’s testimony of the Srebrenica massacre is in this way different from a newspaper report or a descriptive account typical of history textbooks: factual reports *purposely* restrict themselves to describing a narrative of events from an outsider’s perspective. But first-person narrative accounts and other forms of testimony (photographs, film and audio clips, artistic expression, and so on) positively *invite* an affectively charged appreciation of the weight and significance of the event from the perspective of those who experienced it. Vicarious involvement with victims of atrocities, one might conclude, is a route to compassionate empathising with them, which, in turn, is a route which leads up to a viewpoint where one might actually be able to see for oneself – however dimly and fleetingly – precisely that which is so horrible in history’s moral horrors.

The aim of this paper is to develop a critique of what I take to be a *prima facie* compelling curricular justification for intentionally creating educational contexts where young people can learn from history’s moral horrors: that it is favourable to the development of the related psycho-social soft skills (PSSSs) of empathy, moral reasoning, and other forms of interpersonal awareness. This justification, I will argue, not only renders the specific historical content incidental to the development of these skills. Conceiving the development of PSSSs as the primary justificatory grounds for the intimate study in schools and universities of genocide and other forms of systematic, politically motivated extreme cruelty *instrumentalises* such events for the sake of supporting the development of young people’s interpersonal skills and well-being, and I will argue that this is highly ethically problematic, if not actually morally offensive.

The theme of teaching young people about genocide and other forms of systematic, politically motivated horrors is so delicate that I am compelled to take extra care in clarifying the intentions of my argument. My commentary will challenge some of the basic pedagogical assumptions of the ‘Facing History and Ourselves’ genocide education program but it must be understood that my critical interest in this program is merely as an elaborated and rigorously theoretically based *representative* of the justificatory claim I wish to consider. Even if it is true, as I want to suggest, that the ethics of the program’s strategy of marketing itself as a psycho-social intervention aimed at facilitating social adaptation are wrong, this feature devalues in no way the important support it provides for classroom teachers who want to lead their students in a critical examination of historical events of genocide and mass violence. Neither am I even opposed in any general way to the program’s stated goals of developing the set of PSSSs the program designers regard as important to interpersonal awareness, and forming and maintaining so-called ‘positive relationships’. But I do think there are reasons to be suspicious when their development is presented as the reason why young people should become acquainted with the moral horrors of history and, *a fortiori*, when the program’s success and credibility is thought to stand or fall according to whether it succeeds in developing these or other PSSSs. There is undoubtedly a positive justificatory story to be told about ‘Facing History and Ourselves’ and similar educational initiatives. The PSSS justification is just not it.
Civic educational versus moral educational grounds for studying historical moral horrors

Of course, it would be a gross simplification to proceed with the assumption that there has to be just one good reason why it might be important for young people to learn about shocking and real episodes of genocide, systematic politically motivated torture, rape, kidnapping and forced displacement. They are not only multiple, but in every case, are not directly related to the imperative of learning from history’s lessons.

One recurrent plea for the curricular inclusion of the study of genocide, for example, is squarely civic educational. There are cultural and ethnic groups for whom a story of persecution is a rallying point of collective identity. As part of a balanced and rational response to their undeserved misfortune, they may want their stories told in order to shame their persecutors, to share their indignation and to advance the cause of restorative justice. Furthermore, such groups may view public support for the dissemination of their persecution stories and, indeed, widespread public knowledge of them, as a condition of political recognition, in Charles Taylor’s (1995) sense of the term. To this extent, their promulgation may be seen as contributing to the improvement of inter-group relations (Brabeck et al. 1994). In a similar vein, some might suspect that learning about past abuses can help break exclusionary attitudes. The offer of specific historical knowledge of a group’s experience of egregious past injury is, as already suggested, an invitation to vicariously live that experience oneself. Martha Nussbaum (1995, 2001), for example, has argued that narratives of hardship have no rival in terms of their ability to elicit a sense of identification and sympathy between reader and protagonist; a reader cannot but view such stories as tragedies except by appreciating how the story’s events bear on shared and very basic human hopes, fears and concerns. Where it helps cement such bonds of compassion, historical knowledge may well operate as a source of inter-group and inter-personal solidarity and thus as an important counterforce to patterns of prejudice and stereotyping.

Finally, in so far as the sorts of extraordinary historical events in question are liable to be understood by posterity and outsiders allegorically, as common forms of human meanness writ extremely large, they become an attractive foil for reflection on everyday forms of discrimination and a means of sensitising young people to injustice in its many guises and of helping them recognise it in themselves and in others (Brabeck et al. 1994). In light of these considerations, it is small wonder that the very first proposition of the 1993 UNESCO Montreal Declaration on Human Rights Education states that human rights education should explicitly attend to and dwell on the victims of human rights violations and their lived experiences (Baxi, 1997).

Admittedly, these ‘civic educational’ reasons are not neatly separable from what might be considered more straightforwardly ‘moral educational’ reasons. I am not certain how far the distinction can be sustained, but it seems to me that the way that the ‘moral educational’ issue is connected with studying history’s horrors, properly speaking, points to a broader and more diffuse shift of moral outlook – if one that is altogether more difficult to pin down – than merely the shedding of exclusionary attitudes towards one or another social, cultural or ethnic community. Something very much like the possibility that learning from others’ egregious past sufferings may impact on learners in ways that are at once more general and more radical is, in fact, the subject of the first of two main themes perceptible in contemporary discourse on human rights education: how best to characterise, label and describe the ‘perspectival transformation’ that learners exposed to difficult knowledge are supposed to achieve or which, for example, in ethnographic
studies of human rights education experience, they claim to achieve (and sometimes, in fact, do achieve). Is it sufficient for learners to come out of human rights education just ‘travelling with a different view’, to borrow Peters’s (1964) expression? Or is human rights education only successful when it changes attitudes and promotes rights-talk, and translates into progressive personal action?

Furthermore, what kind of transformation process is it? Is it predominantly individual or social? Rational and consciously reflective, or emotional, creative and intuitive? Should it be called ‘transformative learning’ (Mezirow 1997) or ‘emancipatory transformation’ (Tibbitts 2005), ‘conscientisation’ (Freire 1970) or even ‘thinking without banisters’ (Sliwinski 2005)? A second dominant theme in human rights education research is, inevitably, the question of ‘what works?’ seen as a matter of identifying, planning, implementing and assessing pedagogical practices and educational contexts thought to be conducive to the sorts of perspectival transformation regarded as proper to a successful human rights education initiative. If the issue of the goals of human rights education is generally contested, which it is, in this area by contrast we find a smooth consensus. Qualitative evaluative research repeatedly claims to confirm that learning contexts where a sense of safety, trust and openness has been established, and where ‘learner-centred’ pedagogies are practised, empathetic teachers and opportunities for quiet personal reflection are all supportive of states of mind that are more humane, less tolerant of social injustice and personally committed to political progress.

Objections to studying historical moral horrors

Good educational ideas sometimes face big practical hurdles, however – think of service learning and language immersion – but the practicalities of learning from the moral horrors of history seem pleasingly unproblematic. Thematically, it meshes in seamlessly with not one, but at least three, standard subject areas: history, needless to say, but also social studies and language arts. Furthermore, a wealth of well-documented pedagogical experience in the field exists, as was just noted, and is readily available for any teacher wishing to seek out evidence-based pedagogical advice. Bracketing the controversies over how, precisely, to flesh out the idea and process of ‘learning from others’ suffering’, the basic case for setting up experiences so that young people might learn history’s difficult knowledge seems so far to be reasonably straightforward. But while its supporters may be many and detractors few, the idea of exposing adolescents to some of history’s most salient moral horrors does not go entirely unchallenged.

One obvious objection is that certain historical events, while perhaps morally horrible enough, are simply too controversial to be considered a responsible choice as an area in which to build historical knowledge by acquaintance. What I have in mind in this connection are not hypothetical cases of factual historical dispute (these are, undoubtedly, best left to historians to settle), but rather ones that are dogged by normatively loaded popular historical disputes over the victims’ own supposed responsibility for their gross misfortune (e.g., the experience of the Mohawks after the War of Independence and the current conflict in eastern Congo in Africa). In addition to such questions of ‘desert’, popular historical controversies stem from friction between mainstream historians’ accounts of events and national mythologies (e.g., the Canadian government’s former policy of residential schools and the situation of the Palestinian refugees). From their families and peers and in the mass media many children and adolescents hear opinions
about historical controversies and they form opinions about them, and while ideally school can, and should, be a place where calmer heads prevail, there may well be socio-cultural contexts where studying contentious historical episodes in schools may erode rather than improve inter-group relations. The risks here cannot be assessed other than on a strictly case-by-case basis.

Bring to mind the images you associate with the Holocaust and you are well on your way to appreciating a second objection to exposing young people to grotesque human evil: that they might be disturbed by it in unhealthy ways (Brabeck et al. 1994). Counter-intuitively perhaps, empirical research conducted on precisely this question suggests that concerns that adolescents ‘can’t understand’ such evil acts, that they might find the material traumatising, morally paralysing or that it might damage their sense of well-being are largely unfounded; a very typical means of making sense of the Holocaust, indeed, is for young people to semantically link the choices and dispositions of the perpetrators, the bystanders and the victims to what they see as comparable events and individuals in their own day-to-day moral experience.5

Finally, there are also, apparently, some history teachers who object to the use of history instruction as a vehicle for values education. Each subject area has its own interwoven knowledge base, core concepts, truth criteria and internal values; Lee (1992), for one, has argued that to teach history with an eye to promoting values outside the discipline violates the integrity of history itself.6 But one gets the distinct impression that this is the view of a somewhat radical, purist minority. Most teachers seem to want the human rights lessons of history to be taught – and they even want to be the ones to teach them – even if they often do not feel adequately prepared to do so (Brabeck et al. 1994). Early reports of such unease were documented by Sternstrom and Parsons (1982). More recent analyses of relevant textbooks (Siler 1990; Schwartz 1990) claim that standard textbooks seldom pause to consider the broader ethical implications of the human rights abuses they cover.

The allure of the PSSSs justification

One conclusion to be drawn from the last two sections’ brief survey of the jumble of empirical, theoretical and practical arguments cited for and against acquainting young people with historical moral horrors is that they are in general surprisingly uncontroversial, except as regards the justificatory claim that is almost always spontaneously first made in their favour. For just what are the fundamentally important moral lessons that adolescents and young adults are supposed to learn from bearing witness to the suffering of others? Like any richly normative question, we can expect this one to be enduringly contested by basically rational people arguing in good faith. But what I want to draw attention to now is the singular prima facie educational attractiveness of what I called above the PSSS justification as one possible answer to it. I submit that, from the purely pragmatic perspective of most contemporary classroom teachers, their students’ parents and school administrators, the other justificatory interpretations risk being perceived as hopelessly abstract and esoteric (e.g., Mezirow’s (1997) concept of ‘transformative learning’, and Sliwinski’s (2005) ‘thinking without banisters’) or politically radical (e.g., Friere’s (1970) concept of ‘conscient-isation’ and Tibbitt’s (2005) ‘emancipatory transformation’) to the point where any teacher who openly endorses such views runs a significant risk of being instantly labelled as a political missionary. By contrast, the basic
idea behind the PSSS justification is plain, apparently apolitical and, above all, it is worthy: learning about history’s horrors contributes to social adjustment by developing abilities in understanding others’ perspectives and skills in forming and maintaining positive and healthy relationships, and in managing interpersonal conflicts. These attractions, however, are specious.

A sketch of the ‘Facing History and Ourselves’ program

I turn now directly to the ‘Facing History and Ourselves’ (FHAO) program only because, as specified above, it represents a strong version of the PSSS justification. FHAO originated about 25 ago ostensibly in response to teachers’ worries that the standard textbook treatment of the Holocaust was inadequate because it failed to capitalise on this valuable opportunity for moral education. The centrepiece of the program is a 10-week educational unit designed for early adolescents of around 14 years old, typically taught by the regular social studies or language arts teachers. Because the program encourages comparisons between the Holocaust and other genocides, the Holocaust is not its exclusive focus, but a detailed historical case study of the events, circumstances, policies and programs in Germany and German-occupied states in the 1930s and 1940s that make up the story of the Holocaust is the unit’s thematic backbone. It may seem strange, in light of this focus, that FHAO is almost never openly presented as Holocaust education, nor, indeed, even as human rights education, but rather as psycho-social intervention and, most recently, as a character education program, whose primary intent is to promote ‘positive human relationships’ (by which is meant preventing prejudice, discrimination and exclusion based on membership in an identifiable social group and, more generally, reducing inter-group conflicts and improving inter-group relations) through the development of a specific set of relevant psycho-social competencies.7

FHAO is one case where a program’s claims to uniqueness are well-founded. Most values-educational initiatives, it is true, tend to muddle through without much in the way of a theoretical base (Halstead and Taylor 2000) but FHAO is squarely constructed on a tidy theory of the kinds of psycho-social competencies presupposed by positive interpersonal relations and of how children develop these particular psycho-social competencies. The theoretical model, referred to in more recent literature as the ‘Risk and Relationship Framework’, informs the program’s design, intended outcomes and evaluation measures. In a nutshell, the leading idea is that psycho-social developmental is all about learning to ‘perspective-take’, to understand other people’s social experiences and to coordinate one’s own point of view with those of others. According to the framework, this ‘core capacity’ comprises three analytically distinct but interconnected abilities: (1) to understand group processes and relationships; (2) to exercise skills and strategies which establish and maintain good relationships; and (3) to comprehend and predict the meaning others ascribe to one’s actions in a relationship (Schultz, Barr and Selman 2001; Barr 2005).8

Crucial to understanding the program’s characteristic approach is the model’s theoretical assumption that young people make sense of such difficult material by linking it semantically with what Barr (2005) calls ‘critical incidents in their peer culture’ – i.e., examples of violence or social exclusion that they have directly experienced either as a witnesses, victims or perpetrators. Parenthetically, this supposition contrasts interestingly with that of early psychoanalysis-based pedagogical material on the Holocaust which
predicts that children understand moral horrors in history in terms of their own suppressed internal desires to do evil things or the ‘primitive and atrocious wishes of their own infantile nature’ as it was expressed by Anna Freud and Deborah Burlingham (Britzman 1998, 127). Without entering directly into dialogue with these texts, Barr’s (2005) evaluative study of FHAO belies the notion that children and adolescents make meaning of moral horror in history in reference to, as Britzman (1998) puts it, ‘war within’. Be that as it may, a hallmark of the program, and a feature universally recognised as one of its strengths, is its insistence that teachers draw frequent parallels between the program’s historical content and events in students’ own countries, their communities and in their day-to-day peer interactions (Schultz, Barr and Selman 2001). In this way, we come to face history and to face ourselves.

‘Facing History and Ourselves’: a critical perspective

Despite repeated assertions that FHAO reflects the integrative ‘developmental evaluation methodology’ just described, in practice the evaluative studies of the program strike one as being something of a multi-factorial fishing expedition aimed at getting a sense of the global effects of the programme on character development and psycho-social well-being. Schultz, Barr and Selman (2001, 9–12) report, for example, that evaluation studies even measure the effects of the program on ‘risk-taking behaviours’ (e.g., fighting and drinking alcohol) and other ‘social behaviours’ (e.g., engagement in intervention programs and positive social relationships). But, all in all, the explicit rationale for FHAO is the development of interpersonal skills and understanding that are thought to improve people’s ability to manage social relations effectively (Selman 2003, 268). The reviews of evaluation studies paint a complex picture of inconsistent and inconclusive results but one thing is certain: the program is no resounding success even on its own terms. Most worrying, surely, is Schultz and colleagues’ (2001, 20) finding that the program does not significantly influence the core PSSS of perspective-taking.

But even if it were, or could be, retooled in such a way as to better promote the PSSSs it targets, a certain gap would still remain between its high and obviously worthy aspirations for children’s social achievements and identity and the means chosen to pursue them. To illustrate, we are first told that dwelling on the horrors of history can be important to the development of ‘young people’s capacity and commitment to be thoughtful and active participants in society’ (Barr 2005, 156) and then we discover that that means the mastery of interpersonal awareness and a strategic understanding of relationships. The fact that such competencies may be correctly regarded as forms of ‘emotional intelligence’ (cf. Goleman 1995), that their development constitutes ‘social and emotional learning’ (in the manner of Cohen 1999) or stressing that multiple perspective coordination is a ‘cognitive and emotional’ process, as Schultz and colleagues (2001, 7) do, does not change the fact that the underlying account of interpersonal development is a cognitive-constructivist one and thus vulnerable to Hoffman’s (2000) weary Cassandrian objection: what is plainly lacking is an account of why a person would use insight into others’ inner states, irrespective of how differentiated that insight is, to build ‘positive human relationships’ rather than to manipulate others. And even if one is willing to adopt a more generous interpretation and posit that the key PSSSs are intended merely as necessary, not sufficient, conditions of the effective management of interpersonal relations there remains the devastating possibility raised by Colby and Damon’s (1992) research
into moral exemplars. No strong correlation pertains between ‘more adequate’ (i.e., more complex and differentiated) forms of social reflection and moral activism. Especially good perspective-taking ability is simply not typical of the people who are the most motivated and actively engaged in incontestably positive social and helping behaviours. If the ability to appreciate and coordinate other’s perspectives is a sign of intelligence, then Fernando Pessoa (1991) seems to have had a point: to be truly moral it helps to be a bit stupid.

My primary concern is to consider whether the putative fact that educationally dwelling on the moral horrors of history can be important to the development of PSSSs (assuming that it is) is strong justificatory grounds for prescribing it as part of the fundamental education of adolescents. My case that it is not can be summarised in two points. First, on what grounds are we meant to believe that it is the specific historical content that is responsible for the development of PSSSs? The argument, it seems, falls foul of the fallacy of affirming the consequent: if adolescents are exposed to difficult knowledge, then they will acquire specific PSSSs. But even if they do acquire them, it remains entirely plausible that the historical content is incidental to the developmental process. Similar results, surely, could be obtained by having students examine only ‘critical incidents from their peer culture’ or stories of maltreatment and pro-social helping like ‘Eve’s dilemma’.9 Nicholasa Mohr’s teen novel Felito10 or even How Raggedy Anne Got her Candy Heart. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, one of Schultz and colleagues’ research-based recommendations for FHAO mirrors this very possibility: their investigations showed that the program’s traditional target group of 14 year olds were ‘much more focused on and engaged with issues regarding their peer relations rather than inter-group relations in the broader society’ (Schultz, Barr and Selman 2001, 4). From this finding they draw the conclusion that junior high school teachers ‘should orient the ‘ourselves’ part of the curriculum more towards moral issues in the peer world, than would teachers in high school, when students may be more ready to grapple with contemporary societal issues’ (Schultz, Barr and Selman 2001, 24). I read this statement to mean that, from the point of view of developing psycho-social competencies, the historical content of FHAO is perhaps not even merely incidental. It might even get in the way.

Second, when taken in isolation from other more substantive corroborating considerations adumbrated above, the PSSS justification runs a significant risk of instrumentalising history’s moral horrors. And to the extent that it does, it is a clear affront, it seems to me, to the dignity of the victims and sufferers, the survivors and to the historical material itself. Everything hangs on the intentions of educators and how they answer for themselves the question of what ‘fostering social development’ means. The ethics of putting the historical material to use for the sake of what used to be called ‘social adaptation’ – and this is indeed the explicit rationale of socio-emotional learning at least as far as Goleman (1995) is concerned – is highly questionable but not just because doing so treats it as a means to an end. On this score, I would argue that Britzman’s (1998) psychoanalytic assessment of the study of ‘difficult historical knowledge’ fares little better because it frames Holocaust education and similar as being a form of psychotherapy – i.e., its primary interest is in developing children’s abilities to recognise and control their innate violent impulses. Of course, the very idea of learning from history’s moral horrors supposes, to some extent, their instrumentalisation. The trouble stems, rather, from a lack of parity between the moral gravity of the events in question and the comparative moral triviality of the forms of individual social advantage that are
thought to accrue to the possession of PSSSs and that seem often to be regarded as the source of their educational interest. In aesthetic terms, the PSSS justification is an educational decadence. It expends valuable educational resources in the pursuit of frivolities.

To conclude, the thought that adolescents and young adults have fundamentally important moral lessons to learn from history’s ‘difficult knowledge’, as Britzman (1998, 117) refers to it, may be commonplace to the point of being platitudinous. The far more interesting question is the other possibility that there might be moral lessons that can only be learned by attending to grim narratives of shocking and real episodes of genocide, systematically motivated torture, rape, kidnapping and forced displacement told from the victims’ point of view. The distinction in play, in short, is that between strong and weak curricular justification. Weak curricular justification is that which frames learning from history as a substitutable means to achieving an educational end, as one can imagine doing Sudoku puzzles, playing bridge or helping children with mathematics homework as perfectly interchangeable strategies for sharpening cognitive skills among the ageing.

By contrast, material or experiences are strongly justified, I want to stipulate, when they are the exclusive means to some educational achievement. John Dewey in *Moral principles in education* (1969), for example, makes reference to the idea of strong curricular justification when he attempts to expose as a fundamental and recurrent conceptual error the belief that moral education does, or should, seek primarily to instil theoretical knowledge, and not practical knowledge: ‘the only way to prepare for social life’, Dewey (1969, §2) writes, ‘is to engage in social life’. And as everyone who speaks an additional language to even a basic level of functional proficiency can readily attest, ample opportunity for language learners to speak the language is strongly justified since it is not just the best way to develop fluency – there simply is no other way. This analysis of the PSSS justification is meant to show that it is weak and ethically dubious support for why young people should be initiated into the horrors of humanity’s past. Where, then, might one look for strong justification? I submit that it takes a great deal of imagination indeed to discover and recognise the validity of social norms in a socio-political milieu where they are already in place doing their job effectively of serving basic human interests well.

Historians of ideas in the tradition of Isaiah Berlin (1969) and Mary Midgely (2004) argue persuasively, to my mind, that the supposed objectivity and prescriptive force of some of the most cherished human rights cannot be adequately comprehended unless they are viewed against the backdrop of the reasons why, during a formative historical period, they came to be widely regarded as principled dispositions of the utmost social significance. Historical experience affirms and reaffirms the necessity to uphold them and nothing but historical knowledge by acquaintance of these experiences, perhaps, can illustrate quite so vividly what can happen when they are not.

**Notes**

1. For descriptions of each of these programs see respectively Schultz, Barr and Selman (2001) and Van Dreil (2005).
2. These distinctions are discussed in Britzman (1998) and Russell (1911).
3. For representative articulations of the view that moral activism is an essential condition of transformative learning see Baxi (1997) and Tibbitts (2005).
5. On this research see Baridge (1988) and Glynn, Bock and Cohen (1982). It is cited and briefly assessed as well in Brabeck et al. (1994).
6. This point is treated in Halstead and Taylor (2000, 173–5). See also various contributions in the edited volume by Lee et al. (1992).
7. For summarizing statements of FHAO’s aims Barr (2005), Schultz et al. (2001) and Brabeck et al. (1994).
8. For the most authoritative and comprehensive presentation of the Risks and Relationship Framework see Selman (2003).
9. ‘Eve’s dilemma’ is a vignette standardly analysed in recent versions of FHAO. See Barr (2005, 147).
10. The study of which Selman (2005, 226 ff.) recommends as particularly auspicious for the development of the set of psycho-social competencies he refers to as ‘social awareness’.

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